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Abstract 
Although international crises are often believed to represent windows of opportunity to 
strengthen European defense cooperation, recent crises have not seemed to produce a clear 
convergence of European Union (EU) member states’ security interests. This article seeks to 
address this puzzle by arguing that European defense cooperation is a response to crises that 
place European states in a situation of military interdependence. Conversely, asymmetric crises, 
i.e. crises that affect European states unevenly, encourage those states to maintain their 
autonomy of action. This theoretical argument is supported by two case studies: the failure of 
the European Defense Community in the early 1950s and the current difficulties experienced 
by the EU’s military operations. These two cases illustrate a striking continuity in that, because 
of (neo)colonial ties in particular, European states are often unevenly affected by international 
crises, which tends to make defense cooperation less effective. 
Keywords: Defence Co-operation, Interdependence, European Defence Community, 
Common Security and Defence Policy 
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On 17 November 2015, four days after the Paris terror attacks, France officially invoked for the 
first time article 42.7 of the Treaty on European Union (EU), which requires member states to 
come to the aid of one another in the case of armed aggression against one of them. However, 
officials immediately clarified that this appeal would not trigger any EU military action. For 
some commentators, it only confirmed that the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) 
had become a ‘busted flush’ (Menon and Witney 2015, 2). Although international crises are 
widely believed to represent windows of opportunity for strengthening European defense 
cooperation, recent crises have not seemed to produce a clear upgrade in EU member states’ 
common interests or to stimulate their joint action (Menon 2011, Howorth 2014, Müller 2016). 
On the other hand, the recent wave of terror attacks in Europe and the prospect of Brexit 
negotiations have renewed the impetus to hold talks regarding the possible strengthening of 
European defense cooperation (Gentiloni and Pinotti 2016, Le Figaro 2016). In light of these 
hopes and disappointments, identifying the key factors through which crises can (or cannot) 
stimulate European defense cooperation is crucial.  
Many of the authors who seek to explain European defense cooperation focus on the 
role of the US and transatlantic relations (Posen 2006, Berenskoetter and Giegerich 2010, Weiss 
2012, Cladi and Locatelli 2012, Dyson 2013a). One classic argument posits that the European 
Defense Community (EDC) failed because the massive deployment of American troops in 
Europe during the 1950s’ East-West crisis rendered the EDC useless, whereas the CSDP was 
necessitated by the relative disengagement of the US during the 1990s Balkan crises (Jones 
2003, Rosato 2011, Weiss 2012). Consequently, the impact of crises on European defense 
cooperation would essentially depend on the military policy of the US. 
Without denying the importance of the American factor, this article aims to reopen the 
debate based on two observations. On the one hand, with regard to the EDC, the US 
commitment to maintaining a strong presence on the European continent dates back to 
September 1950. This factor alone does not explain why France supported an ambitious 
European army project in October 1950 and changed its mind only after much hesitation in 
1954. On the other hand, the CSDP might have been initially established to take over for NATO 
in the Balkans, in a context marked by a relative US disengagement from Europe in the 1990s. 
However, since the CSDP has become operational, the vast majority of EU military 
interventions have been deployed to Africa, which had never previously been a favored 
destination for NATO interventions. In Africa, the CSDP essentially took over for former 
colonial powers’ national policies rather than for NATO. Therefore, in Africa, the key question 
is not so much why Europeans started to act without the US but why they started to act together. 
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US policy alone cannot explain why joint EU operations became a regular practice in Africa in 
the early 2000s and then proved increasingly difficult to launch a few years later (Haine 2011, 
Koepf 2012). European defense cooperation can only be understood by adopting a more 
comprehensive analytical framework.  
Theoretically, this article aims to demonstrate that European defense cooperation is a 
response to the military interdependence that international crises impose on European states. In 
particular, this article investigates the impact of crises on European states’ interests. Crises that 
affect the interests of European states jointly are more likely to lead to stronger interdependence 
and to stimulate defense cooperation. Conversely, asymmetric crises, i.e., crises that unevenly 
affect European states, tend to generate less interdependence, thus encouraging those states to 
preserve their autonomy of action. Empirically, this article focuses on the case of France and 
highlights a striking continuity between the current CSDP and the 1950s’ EDC project; in both 
cases, European defense cooperation suffered from asymmetric overseas crises, which were 
linked to France’s (neo)colonial ties. In particular, this article argues that the CSDP has been 
hampered by the asymmetric nature of African crises, which unevenly affect European states’ 
interests and generate fears of entrapment and abandonment. 
In addition to secondary sources and public documents, this article relies on French 
archives in the case of the EDC and on interviews with French military and diplomatic officials 
in the case of CSDP operations. The interviewees worked or had worked at the Permanent 
Representation of France to the EU or at the Berlin Embassy. 
  
The driving forces underlying European defense cooperation 
 
This article aims to investigate the driving forces behind the aggregation of military capabilities, 
particularly armed forces, with a view towards joint action, within the framework of the 
European integration process. This is what is understood here by the generic expression 
‘European defense cooperation’. The key question is which driving forces can prompt European 
states to invest in defense cooperation within a European framework as opposed to either purely 
national policies or transatlantic cooperation within the NATO framework. Although the 
second part of the problem (European versus transatlantic cooperation) has been thoroughly 
investigated, the first part of the problem (European cooperation versus national policies) 
remains understudied. 
 
 
Pierre Haroche 
 
4 
 
European defense cooperation as a response to changing transatlantic relations 
 
For neorealists, the CSDP was a response to American hegemony. They state that, since the end 
of the Cold War, the unipolarity and freedom of action garnered by the US from its power 
position have made its commitment to European states less predictable and less reliable (Hyde-
Price 2006). This situation has led European states to cooperate with one another to ensure their 
autonomy in the event of American disengagement and to ensure their influence on American 
policy, which Posen (2006) sees as an attempt to balance US power. Similarly, for Oswald 
(2006), European defense policy is a form of ‘soft balancing between friends’ that aims to 
establish more balanced transatlantic partnership. For Art (2004), a ‘looser version of balance 
of power’ can explain the CSDP’s development as a ‘hedge’ against American abandonment. 
For other neorealists, European states’ cooperation out of fear of abandonment by the 
Americans represents an instance of bandwagoning because it aims to keep the US close rather 
than competing with it (Cladi and Locatelli 2012, Dyson 2013a). 
Certainly, increasing transatlantic frictions after the Cold War and the risk of 
abandonment by the US prompted European states to develop the practice of autonomous 
defense cooperation. However, this explanation only resolves one aspect of the problem. It 
explains why European states may not want to rely solely on NATO; it does not explain why 
those European states may want to act through a European framework in particular. European 
states cannot rely on the US as much as they used to, but that does not mean that they can or 
want to rely on one another within the EU. Howorth and Menon (2009, 741) rightly observe 
that the focus on transatlantic relations has led many scholars to overlook the inter-European 
dimension of the problem: ‘What the soft balancers fail to appreciate is that [the] logic of 
international politics applies within the EU in much the same way as it does in its relations with 
the outside world’. Indeed, EU member states seek to preserve their national autonomy of action 
before considering European cooperation. As such, explanations of transatlantic divergences 
cannot fully account for the development of European defense cooperation. What is still missing 
is an explanation of inter-European convergence. Admittedly, Rosato’s argument (2011) about 
the need to balance Soviet power during the Cold War and Jones’ argument (2003) about the 
risk of German hegemony partially address this part of the problem, but they are difficult to 
generalize. In the late 1990s when the CSDP was launched, Russia was no longer perceived as 
a serious threat (Meyer 2006, Ch. 3), and Germany was no longer a major security concern; 
France even encouraged Germany to acquire more capabilities so that it could contribute to the 
provision of European security (Weiss 2012, 662–663).  
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Constructivist authors have placed the problem of inter-European convergence at the 
center of their studies. However, they have focused on how this convergence occurs rather than 
on the driving forces from which it originates (Meyer and Strickmann 2010, 66). Meyer (2006) 
Giegerich (2006), and Schmidt and Zyla (2013) observe a certain degree of convergence among 
the EU’s strategic cultures through shared experiences during joint missions, similar threat 
assessments, learning from crises and elite socialization. Overall, a division of labor tends to 
exist between constructivists and realists. Whereas realists highlight the systemic 
transformations that underlie European cooperation, constructivists focus on the ideational 
changes caused by those systemic transformations. Additionally, when constructivists seek to 
incorporate systemic factors, they tend to focus on transatlantic relations, as realists do. For 
example, Meyer and Strickmann (2010, 74) state that an increasingly unbalanced distribution 
of material capabilities between the US and its European allies heightened transatlantic frictions 
in the 1990s and offered norm entrepreneurs opportunities to promote an autonomous European 
defense policy. Similarly, Berenskoetter and Giegerich (2010) argue that an enduring 
‘dissonance’ with the US in the 1990s led Germany to turn to a strategy of emancipation by 
investing in the CSDP. More recently, although Berenskoetter (2013) has denounced the 
‘American-centrism’ of realist analyses, he has also identified a ‘transatlantic divergence in 
strategic cultures’ as the main driver behind the CSDP. Therefore, constructivists do not provide 
an alternative to the realist bias towards transatlantic relations.  
Other authors have adopted a bureaucratic approach and have emphasized the role of 
key actors who pushed for the development of European defense cooperation. Howorth (2004) 
has highlighted the role of the international epistemic community of defense-related officials 
who gave birth to the CSDP through their discursive interactions. For Mérand (2010), the CSDP 
resulted from the strategies of some European diplomats and military leaders who saw an 
opportunity to protect their bureaucratic capital, which had been challenged by both the Balkan 
Wars and the end of the Cold War. Buchet de Neuilly (2009) stresses that EU military 
operations are largely the result of competition among EU institutions, with each actor 
attempting to promote its own expertise. Similarly, Dijkstra (2012) argues that Council officials 
in particular have employed agenda-setting strategies to further their bureaucratic interest of 
launching new missions. However, the bureaucratic approach does not highlight a specific 
driving force that underlies European defense cooperation. Instead, by focusing on ‘meso-level’ 
social interactions, it complements the macro-level approaches privileged by realists and 
constructivists. Specifically, Mérand (2010) argues that systemic shocks, such as the emergence 
of a unipolar world, translate into institutional developments only through their impact on 
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policymakers’ career prospects. Similar to constructivist studies, the bureaucratic approach 
specifies how European defense cooperation developed but does not provide a more 
comprehensive explanation of its development than the neorealists do. 
Finally, Pohl (2014) has challenged the realist focus on the international level and has 
offered a liberal interpretation of European defense cooperation. Pohl argues that governments 
adapt their behavior according to expected electoral consequences. Therefore, domestic societal 
expectations are the real drivers of the CSDP. However, this focus on national preferences does 
not explain why European states have decided that, in some case, they should act together 
instead of separately. If a state’s defense policy is essentially a response to its domestic values, 
a purely national policy seems prima facie to be the most plausible outcome. Moreover, 
Moravcsik’s liberal intergovernmentalist theory, to which Pohl refers, does not simply explain 
European policies as the product of domestic societal demands; it also highlights that those 
societal demands tend to favor European integration because of rising trade ties among 
European economies (1998, 473). However, that type of explanation, which could account for 
the convergence of national preferences towards European defense cooperation, is precisely 
what is missing from Pohl’s liberal theory. 
This article intends to offer a more adequate theoretical approach that can account not 
only for the transatlantic drivers but also for the inter-European drivers through which crises 
can stimulate European defense cooperation.  
 
European defense cooperation as an inter-European problem 
 
Focusing on the inter-European level, some authors have analyzed defense cooperation 
as a collective action problem. Eilstrup-Sangiovanni (2014) and Nováky (2015) note that 
collective action is easier when it produces not only public goods that benefit all states (e.g., 
regional stability), thus encouraging them to freeride but also private goods that benefit some 
states in particular (e.g., protection of a trade partner), thus encouraging those states to react 
effectively. Eilstrup-Sangiovanni (2014) concludes that the CSDP is highly subject to collective 
action problems because it focuses on crisis management, which is mainly (although not 
exclusively) a public good, and lacks a dominant power that is willing to shoulder a greater 
share of the defense burden. While focusing on the distinction between public and private goods 
can help understand why European states are quicker to react to some situations than to others, 
it does not explain why they are encouraged to react collectively or separately. In other words, 
these arguments leave open the question of what factors potentially encourage European states 
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to pursue their ‘private goods’ jointly. Addressing a similar question, Kreps (2011) has argued 
that the US preferred multilateral to unilateral interventions when it faced a crisis that induced 
a long time horizon, thereby allowing it to focus on long-term payoffs. This theory could help 
us understand why some crises are more favorable to cooperation in general than others are; 
however, it would not explain why some crises are more specifically favorable to inter-
European cooperation. We thus need to focus on inter-European relations.  
This problem has been partially addressed by Dyson (2013b, Dyson and Konstadinides 
2013). Dyson’s main argument is that European defense cooperation is an instance of ‘reformed 
bandwagoning’ on US power (2013b, 420). He essentially focuses on European states’ different 
degrees of Atlanticism, which he explains by a ‘variance in external vulnerability’, particularly 
in terms of energy dependence and geographical position. For example, Dyson argues that 
France’s geographic position and colonial ties encouraged it to ‘bandwagon more loosely’ 
during the Cold War (429). However, in the case of the 2011 Libyan crisis, Dyson also contends 
that the divergence on the question of the military intervention between France and the UK on 
the one hand and Germany on the other hand can be explained by the divergence in their 
respective sources of dependable energy supply (436). This type of inter-European approach 
can actually be systematized beyond geographic positions and energy interests. I next present a 
theoretical argument based on the concept of interdependence that considers the variation in 
European states’ capabilities and interests and provides a more comprehensive approach to the 
factors that affect inter-European convergence and divergence.  
Instead of presenting European defense cooperation as an effect of transatlantic 
relations, I argue that it should be primarily seen as a response to the interdependence among 
European states. States are encouraged to act jointly only when they are interdependent in the 
pursuit of their interests. By interdependence, I mean that several states’ interests are mutually 
vulnerable to one another’s actions (Keohane and Nye 1977, 13-19). Although the concept of 
interdependence is often limited to its economic dimension (McMillan 1997), it also includes 
military interdependence (Keohane and Nye 1977, 10). Two states can be mutually vulnerable 
at a primary level because their decisions could seriously harm each other’s security. 
Cooperation can respond to that problem by performing a security management function 
(Wallander and Keohane 1999, 28). The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
is an example. At a secondary level, two states can be mutually vulnerable because they need 
each other’s assistance (Snyder 1984, 471–472) either to confront a common threat or to cope 
with external risks. Cooperation can respond to those problems by performing the function of 
an alliance. The French-British Entente Cordiale is an example. More specifically, defense 
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cooperation—that is, the aggregation of military capabilities with a view towards joint 
actions—can be a response to both primary- and secondary-level interdependence problems. 
For example, the establishment of NATO responded to a twofold transatlantic interdependence 
problem. At a primary level, NATO sought to manage its members’ vulnerability to one another 
by controlling German rearmament. At a secondary level, NATO sought to respond to its 
members’ mutual need for assistance to cope with the Soviet threat. NATO has been both a 
security management institution and an alliance (Wallander and Keohane 1999, 40–46). I argue 
that, when European defense cooperation occurs, it seeks to respond to specifically inter-
European interdependence problems. 
Interdependence among states can vary according to the situation, which is why we must 
explore the impact of international crises. By ‘crisis’, I mean an intensification of disruptive 
interactions between two or more actors that increases the probability of (but does not 
necessarily lead to) an armed conflict, which, in turn, destabilizes international relations 
(Brecher 1996). Most authors acknowledge the decisive role played by crises in the 
development of European defense cooperation. For realists, crises essentially play the role of 
‘catalysts’ (Art 2004, 1997) or ‘precipitating events’ (Posen 2006, 173) through which systemic 
factors are manifested. Following a constructivist approach, crises also act as formative 
experiences from which lessons are learned (Meyer 2006, Ch. 4). Finally, from a bureaucratic 
perspective, crises matter because of their impact on bureaucratic interests (Buchet de Neuilly 
2006). I will argue that crises can ‘catalyze’ variations of interdependence among European 
states. Because they constitute disruptive events with international implications, crises can 
affect states’ different interests. Crises can affect state security by generating threats, such as 
the 1950s East-West crisis in Europe that increased the risk of a Soviet invasion. Crises can 
also simply represent a risk to some entrenched political or economic interest. These more 
limited interests include, in particular, privileged trading ties, sources of dependable energy 
supply, and the stability of strategic allies that are sources of diplomatic influence. States whose 
interests are jeopardized by a crisis are thus encouraged to act to protect their interests. In turn, 
this incentive can generate interdependence. 
To specify the impact of crises on European interdependence, we can distinguish the 
factors that make European states more or less dependent on their European partners and the 
factors that make this dependence more or less mutual. 
In terms of dependence, the main factor to consider is European states’ capabilities in 
relation to the challenges that are posed by the crises. The less able a state is to cope alone with 
a crisis that challenges its interests, the more dependent it is on external support and the more 
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incentivized it will be to seek defense cooperation. Partners’ support provides not only 
additional military capabilities but also additional diplomatic influence, particularly to avoid a 
backlash from other actors. Conversely, the more a state can rely on its own forces to respond 
effectively to a crisis, the less dependent it is on external support, and because defense 
cooperation is costly as a result of interoperability, cohesion and effectiveness challenges 
(Weitsman 2014), the fewer incentives it will have to seek defense cooperation. Because of the 
existence of transatlantic ties, we should also consider potential military support from the US. 
The more American support is lacking or inadequate when a European state faces a crisis, the 
more this state will depend on its European partners and will be motivated to invest in European 
defense cooperation.  
To study the mutual nature of European states’ military dependence in a crisis, the main 
factor to consider is how these states’ interests are affected by the crisis. On the one hand, the 
more a crisis affects the interests of several states jointly, the more it increases their 
interdependence. Indeed, states affected by the same crisis can risk mutually harming one 
another’s interests by adopting uncoordinated decisions (primary interdependence), or they can 
mutually need one another’s support to address the crisis (secondary interdependence). 
Accordingly, such crises are opportunities to promote defense cooperation. On the other hand, 
the more unevenly a crisis affects a group of states, the less it increases their interdependence. 
A crisis that affects some member states much more than others can be called an asymmetric 
crisis, in the sense that it produces asymmetric incentives within this group. Because European 
states differ in terms of geographic positions, trading patterns, sources of dependable energy 
supply, and (neo)colonial ties, they are potentially unevenly affected by external threats and 
risks and are thus subject to asymmetric crises (Dyson 2013b, Eilstrup-Sangiovanni 2014, 90–
91). Asymmetric crises generate incentives that are the exact opposite of those generated by 
interdependence. In a situation of interdependence, states are mutually vulnerable to one 
another and are thus encouraged to act jointly; in an asymmetric crisis, some states are 
vulnerable to a threat or a risk that does not affect their partners, and they are thus more 
encouraged to act separately. The notion of an ‘asymmetric crisis’ in the military realm can be 
compared to the notion of an ‘asymmetric shock’ in the economic realm, i.e., an economic event 
that affects some members of an economic union more than others. In particular, asymmetric 
shocks increase the cost of monetary unions, as the member states that are affected by the shock 
can no longer resort to devaluation to adjust their economy (Krugman 2013, 440). Similarly, 
asymmetric crises make defense cooperation riskier.  
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In the event of an asymmetric crisis, typical problems that constitute the ‘alliance 
security dilemma’ (Snyder 1984, Kupchan 1988, Cha 2000, Press-Barnathan 2006, Kim 2011) 
are more likely to occur. First, the states whose interests are most affected can be abandoned 
by their partners (Snyder 1984, 466–467). Second, states that have no interests at stake can be 
trapped into ‘pulling the other’s chestnuts out of the fire’ (Snyder 1984, 474). Third, states that 
are eager to intervene in a crisis that does not interest their partners can be hindered, even if 
they do not expect assistance, because their engagement in defense cooperation reduces the 
availability of their military capabilities. This reduced availability may be because some of their 
forces are integrated into joint military units or because they are engaged in a joint operation. 
Hindrance can be analyzed as an intermediate problem between abandonment and entrapment: 
as in the case of abandonment, a state that fears hindrance is primarily concerned with its 
insufficient capacity—not with its lack of interest; on the other hand, as in the case of 
entrapment, the problem arises because the alliance is constraining—not because it is loose. In 
a monetary union, a state that is affected by an asymmetric shock may be hindered by its loss 
of monetary flexibility; similarly, in the context of defense cooperation, a state that is affected 
by an asymmetric crisis may be hindered by its loss of military flexibility. Because they 
generate abandonment, entrapment and hindrance, asymmetric crises make cooperation less 
effective and riskier. The negative effects of the ‘alliance security dilemma’ on European 
defense cooperation have been noted by Dyson (2013b). However, Dyson essentially explored 
European states’ fear of entrapment and abandonment by the US (2013b, 428). I argue that the 
inter-European dimension of the ‘alliance security dilemma’ can also be systematically 
explored, in particular through the concept of asymmetric crises.  
The problem of asymmetric crises highlights the importance of considering the 
geographic dimension of crises. In particular, crises that can only result in overseas conflicts 
are more likely to produce asymmetric incentives among European states. First, the only states 
whose specific interests will be challenged by such conflicts are often those states that have 
privileged relations with the regions at stake. Second, in the context of an overseas crisis, the 
action of a European state is more likely to depend on its coordination with other powers that 
are militarily present in the region than on the support of its European partners. In this case, 
inter-European interdependence competes with dependence to overseas regions. Certainly, 
asymmetric effects are not limited to the case of overseas crises, but they are more likely in the 
case of out-of-area operations (Kupchan 1988, Tams 1999, 84–87). 
  
(Table 1) 
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The difference between a crisis that generates strong interdependence and an 
asymmetric crisis is a difference of degree, not of nature. For European powers, a crisis is more 
or less asymmetric. Moreover, the key factors may interact in various combinations. For 
instance, a crisis in which the US provides important support can nevertheless induce strong 
inter-European interdependence, leading to some European defense cooperation because it 
affects all European states’ strategic interests. Similarly, a crisis in which the US provides no 
support can nevertheless induce very limited inter-European interdependence because it affects 
only one European state’s interests. 
Finally, I have focused on the material factors that affect inter-European 
interdependence. However, these material factors essentially affect European defense 
cooperation through their impact on the actors’ perception (Meyer and Strickmann 2010). In 
particular, it is necessary to consider the elites’ perception and interpretation of national 
interests (Weldes 1996). In the case of France, we will see that French elites perceived the 
‘French Union’ (the French colonial empire) as an essential pillar of France’s power in the 
1950s and African security as an essential factor of France and Europe’s security in the 2000s. 
In turn, these perceptions tended to reinforce the impact of asymmetric crises on European 
defense cooperation. 
 
The empirical cases 
 
Two case studies have been selected to illustrate the theoretical argument: the failure of the 
EDC project in the early 1950s and the evolution of CSDP military operations since the early 
2000s. At first glance, these two cases may seem difficult to compare. The EDC was an attempt 
to achieve a fully integrated European army, whereas the CSDP is an instance of loose 
cooperation among national armed forces. The EDC aimed to provide collective defense, 
whereas the CSDP is relatively more concerned with crisis management; the EDC was a treaty, 
whereas CSDP operations implement treaty provisions. However, the aggregation of European 
armed forces with a view towards joint action lies at the core of both cases. To some extent, 
national policymakers had to answer very similar questions in both contexts. In the case of the 
EDC, they had to decide whether they were ready to accept the integration of national forces 
within a European army; in the case of CSDP military operations, they have to decide whether 
they are ready to provide national forces and to place them under European command. 
Therefore, both cases provide good empirical tests for a theory that aims to identify the key 
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factors that encourage European states to aggregate their forces. This focus on force aggregation 
also explains why this article does not aim to explain the CSDP in general—its establishment 
or institutional development—but only member states’ support and contributions to joint 
military actions. Since the CSDP has not created an EU army, it essentially aggregates forces 
through the missions that it undertakes. Finally, this comparison between the EDC and CSDP 
operations will allow us to identify long-term trends and potential continuities in European 
states’ defense interests. Indeed, we will see that, in both cases, European defense cooperation 
was initially stimulated by crises that generated interdependence between some major European 
powers, but it was then increasingly weakened by the rise of asymmetric crises linked to 
(neo)colonial ties. In the 1950s, as in the present day, we will also observe a similar tension 
between (former) colonial powers that are particularly concerned with overseas crises and states 
that are primarily concerned by the Russian threat. 
 In light of space constraints, I will focus on the case of France in particular. France 
inspired the EDC project and eventually scuttled it. Moreover, France has been the initiator of 
most CSDP military operations and is, overall and by far, the most important contributor of 
military personnel (Buchet de Neuilly 2009, 84; Eilstrup-Sangiovanni 2014, 106). I will 
specifically focus on CSDP military operations in Francophone African countries, where 
France has played a particularly prominent role: the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in 
2003 and 2006, Chad in 2008–2009, Mali since 2013 and the Central African Republic (CAR) 
since 2014. Of course, the case of France alone cannot fully account for the evolution of 
European defense cooperation. However, because of the central role that France has played in 
the EDC and CSDP military operations, the convergences and divergences between France and 
other European states, such as Germany and the UK, the two other primary military players, 
should provide good insights into inter-European defense dynamics.  
 
The EDC: The East-West crisis versus colonial crises 
 
In 1950, France suggested the idea of a fully integrated European army. However, after the 
French government managed to rally its European and American partners around the project, 
the treaty failed to be ratified by the French National Assembly. 
As is the case when they study the current CSDP, realists who seek to explain the failure 
of the EDC insist mainly on the role of the US. For Jones (2003), the EDC responded to the 
security dilemma caused by the prospect of a rearmed West Germany. The primary reason for 
the EDC’s failure was the US decision to maintain a strong military presence on the European 
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continent. This commitment resolved the security dilemma and thus removed the EDC’s 
purpose. Rosato (2011) argues that European states decided to pool certain aspects of their 
sovereignty in the 1950s to effectively balance the overwhelming superiority of Soviet power. 
However, Rosato believes that, although the EDC responded to the Soviet threat while limiting 
German sovereignty, it was not France’s optimal outcome. The solution that consisted of a 
strong American presence on the continent and the admission of West Germany into NATO 
proved both more effective in controlling West Germany and less costly in terms of sovereignty. 
Like Jones, Rosato argues that the American commitment allowed France to reject the EDC. 
Although the American factor is fundamental, it nevertheless fails to account for the 
entire problem. In 1950, the US announced to its allies both the strengthening of its military 
presence in Europe and its intention to rearm West Germany within the NATO framework 
(Trachtenberg and Gehrz 2000, 9, 21–22). In 1954, the American commitment to defend Europe 
while controlling West Germany was not novel. Why, then, did the French prefer to advance 
their own German rearmament plan within the framework of a European army in 1950 and then 
give up and return to the NATO option in 1954? A traditional answer focuses on French 
domestic politics, particularly the shifting of parliamentary alliances (Aron and Lerner 1956, 
Parsons 2003). However, I will argue that the evolution of the National Assembly was largely 
encouraged by the evolution of French military leaders, which, in turn, was largely a reaction 
to the evolution of the international situation. France was confronted by two types of crises: the 
first consisted of the East-West crisis in Europe, and the second consisted of colonial crises. If 
the East-West crisis placed France and West Germany in a situation of interdependence and 
thus initially favored the European army project, colonial crises were asymmetric and solely 
affected France. These colonial crises’ rising importance over the period thus led the French to 
regard the EDC as a hindrance to their military efforts. 
 
French-German interdependence 
 
North Korea’s invasion of South Korea on 25 June 1950 provoked a European crisis. Because 
the offensive had likely been approved by Moscow, Western leaders feared that it was the 
prelude to a Soviet offensive in Europe (Fursdon 1980, 67–72). They were even more concerned 
because a huge imbalance of forces existed in Europe: it was estimated that 12 NATO divisions 
faced 210 Soviet divisions (Fursdon 1980, 71). Three factors stimulated interdependence 
among Western European states. First, the crisis could have led to a general conflict in Europe 
and thus affected all Western European states’ interests. Second, no single European power was 
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able to cope with this threat on its own. Third, because the US was not willing to address the 
crisis alone and asked for German rearmament, Western European powers (especially France 
and West Germany) became more dependent on one another’s defense policies. 
On 12 September 1950, US Secretary of State Dean Acheson declared that the American 
government was willing to send ‘substantial forces’ to Europe only if its European allies were 
prepared to make an effort and to accept German rearmament within NATO (Trachtenberg and 
Gehrz 2000, 9). The French were firmly opposed to this prospect, but they found themselves 
isolated and under pressure (Fursdon 1980, 83). Since 1945, their strategy of independence had 
been based on maintaining a weak and disarmed Germany. They now had to confront the fact 
that German rearmament would occur with or without their approval. In the context of East-
West competition, the risk was that the US might eventually make West Germany a great 
military power that could rival France within NATO and ultimately pose a threat. 
At a primary level, France and West Germany were vulnerable to each other because on 
the one hand, France, as an occupying power, still had an influence over German rearmament; 
on the other hand, German rearmament would occur anyway and presented the risk of 
weakening France’s position in Europe. At a secondary level, both countries would have needed 
each other’s assistance to confront a Soviet invasion. This situation of military interdependence 
led the French government to adopt the idea of a European army as an alternative to a 
remilitarized West Germany, which could slip from France’s control. On 14 October 1950, Jean 
Monnet, the Planning Commissioner, wrote the following to René Pleven, the French President 
of the Council: 
If we let things go, sooner or later we shall have to accept a compromise solution 
(priority granted to France, but a German army of small units) that will only be an 
illusion. The German army will be reconstituted through the back door. Our 
resistance will have been for nothing. (Monnet 1976, 502)  
Monnet recommended that the government reiterate its opposition to the reconstitution 
of a German army and suggested that the solution could be found in the creation of a European 
army with a unified command under the direction of a supranational authority. These 
suggestions formed the basis of the Pleven plan, which was approved by the National Assembly 
on 24 October 1950. Compared with the American plan, which directly integrated West 
Germany into NATO, the Pleven plan’s aim was to maximize French control over German 
troops.  
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It is important to note that, at this stage, the French government had the support of top 
military leaders. On 24 July 1951, the French Joint Chiefs of Staff stated that the EDC was 
indeed preferable to the direct inclusion of West Germany in NATO, which would weaken 
France’s influence (David 2006, 119). On 24 April 1952, General Juin, Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, stated his support for the EDC option ‘because it is essential to immediately 
strengthen the defense of Western Europe and because a negative position would have led to 
the reconstitution of the German army, with the complicity of the United States’ (Guillen 1983, 
9). The East-West crisis and the French-German interdependence that it had generated thus led 
to a project to create a European army. However, other crises would impose an increasing 
constraint on France: the anti-colonial wars.  
 
France’s fear of hindrance to its military efforts 
 
From a European perspective, because colonial crises in Indochina and North Africa solely 
affected France, they constituted asymmetric crises. They thus not only failed to stimulate 
European interdependence but also made the prospect of an integrated European army much 
more problematic, as it could become a hindrance to French military efforts. 
Since 1946, France had been engaged in a colonial war in Indochina. Beginning in 1951, 
more than 120,000 soldiers were engaged in Indochina (Bodin 1996, 36). The Indochina War 
ultimately led to the French defeat of Dien Bien Phu on 7 May 1954. However, French forces 
remained in South Vietnam until 1956 (Cadeau 2010). Moreover, another colonial conflict 
broke out during this period: the uprising of France’s protectorates in North Africa. In Tunisia, 
the January 1952 arrest of the nationalist leader Habib Bourguiba sparked riots, bombings and 
guerrilla warfare. Riots simultaneously broke out in Morocco. Although 16,000 soldiers were 
already in Tunisia, two infantry divisions were sent as reinforcements in 1954; in Morocco, the 
number of French soldiers rose from 45,000 in 1952 to 100,000 in 1956 (Cattet 2010, 37).  
From the perspective of European defense cooperation, these crises were problematic 
because they created tension between Europe and overseas territories. On 23 August 1951, the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff outlined the points on which they urged the government to be firm in 
negotiating the EDC treaty. First, France would need to keep some of its forces under national 
command to secure its presence in Indochina and North Africa. Second, France needed to be 
able to assign more forces than West Germany to the European army to ensure that the EDC 
Commander-in-Chief would be French (Guillen 1983, 11–12). Indeed, a European army under 
German leadership would have been much more favorable for West Germany—and much 
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costlier for France—than the NATO option proposed by the US. However, the problem was 
that those simultaneous requirements—maintaining enough troops under national command to 
fight overseas while assigning enough French troops to the EDC to match German troops—
actually conflicted with each other. 
After the treaty was signed in 1952, the problem was aggravated by the worsening 
situation in Indochina. The government was thus led to reduce its forecast for French forces 
that would be integrated into the EDC. The German contingent was expected to outnumber the 
French contingent by 115,000 soldiers in 1954 (David 2006, 123). The Joint Chiefs of Staff 
planned to recall French forces from North Africa; however, from 1952–1953, riots in Tunisia 
and Morocco necessitated the deployment of additional troops from Europe (Guillen 1983, 23). 
The French army thus faced a dilemma: whether to jeopardize the French presence in North 
Africa or to allow the EDC to become unbalanced in West Germany’s favor. A solution would 
have been to share the colonial burden with France’s European partners. Indeed, in 1952, the 
French Air Staff suggested the creation of a European political authority capable of ‘taking over 
French external burdens to defend the French Union’s overseas territories’ (Baudet 1994, 170). 
However, this suggestion remained vague because, in the context of the Cold War, France’s 
European partners were unlikely to accept being trapped in colonial wars. Weakening the 
French presence overseas was not seen as a viable option either because French elites perceived 
the French Union as an essential pillar of France’s power. In January 1953, a note by the 
political director of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated the following: 
France remains a great power above all through the French Union. It is through the 
French Union that we can balance Germany’s resurgent power. However, it has 
been amply demonstrated that the European Defense Community presents the 
greatest risks for the cohesion of the French Union. (Archives nationales 1953) 
French diplomats also noted that the EDC would lead to ‘extreme difficulties’ in the defense of 
France’s overseas territories and in the longer term, to ‘the collapse of the French Union, 
without which France is nothing on the world stage’ (Archives diplomatiques 1953). The final 
option was to reject the treaty. Starting in 1953, most military leaders progressively rallied to 
this solution. On 3 January 1953, General Juin, who was an ardent advocate for integrating 
French North Africa into the defense of Europe (Vial 2000, 141), publicly criticized the EDC:  
With the events already happening in Indochina and those beginning to happen in 
North Africa, we would be in an impossible situation, and the Germans would soon 
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constitute the overwhelming majority of the Community, which was not what was 
originally planned. (Juin 1960, 260–261) 
On 16 January 1953, General Koenig, the former military governor of the French Zone of 
Occupation in Germany, stated that ‘France cannot accept the French Union being cut in half’ 
(Service historique de la Défense 1953a). On 25 February 1953, General de Gaulle accused the 
EDC of ‘killing’ the French Union. In December 1953, General Gérardot, a former Air Force 
Chief of Staff, wrote an article in the Revue de Défense Nationale that stated the following:  
Combining our country, a Euro-African power whose future lies essentially within 
the French Union, with Germany, a purely European power constantly oriented 
towards the East since the Teutonic Knights, the EDC treaty is designed in line with 
Germanic concerns and thus leads France to a path that is no longer its own. 
(Service historique de la Défense 1953b) 
In 1953, the French government attempted to address these concerns and managed to 
have its European partners sign additional protocols that facilitated in particular the withdrawal 
of some integrated forces in case of an overseas crisis (Service historique de la Défense 1953c). 
However, although the National Assembly still supported the EDC project in 1952 (Service 
historique de la Défense 1952), beginning in 1953, the opposition of military leaders, especially 
Marshal Juin, who was very influential in Parliament (Vial 2000, 157), played a crucial role. 
During the National Assembly’s ratification debates in August 1954, the Foreign Affairs 
Committee’s rapporteur, Socialist Jules Moch, highlighted that by not having to carry out 
missions outside Europe, West Germany would necessarily dominate the EDC. Similarly, the 
National Defense Committee’s rapporteur, Gaullist Raymond Triboulet, concluded, ‘We are 
told: “Equip fourteen divisions for the EDC; afterwards, take care of Africa and overseas 
territories, if you still have resources and men left”. Here comes fully to light what is 
unacceptable for France in the EDC’ (Journal Officiel de la République française 1954). On 30 
August 1954, the Assembly rejected the treaty. 
Asymmetric colonial crises had become increasingly constraining since 1952 and 
transformed the EDC into a hindrance to French military efforts. 
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CSDP military operations: interdependence versus asymmetry in African crises 
 
The comparison of Europe in the 1950s and post-Cold War Europe reveals two structural 
changes. On the one hand, the fall of the Soviet Union removed the common threat that had 
been the source of French-German interdependence in the 1950s. Rosato (2011) argues that 
after the collapse of the USSR, the emergence of a genuine European military community 
became unlikely. On the other hand, gradual American disengagement from the continent had 
the opposite effect: because European states could not rely on the US as much as they had 
previously, they became more militarily dependent on one another. Jones (2003, 145) highlights 
the US European Command’s personnel decrease from 326,000 soldiers in 1989 to 100,000 in 
2000 as a decisive factor. This American withdrawal was accompanied by a certain reluctance 
to commit troops to European crises, as manifested during the conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo. 
Many authors agree that the transatlantic tensions that arose during the Balkan crises of the 
1990s were the driving force that underlay the birth of the CSDP at the Saint-Malo French-
British Summit in December 1998 (Art 2004, 191, 196–199; Posen 2006, 173–178; 
Berenskoetter and Giegerich 2010, 436–441; Hofmann 2011, Weiss 2012, 674–677). 
According to those authors, European states wanted to be able to respond to a European crisis 
autonomously instead of relying solely on NATO and US support. Indeed, two of the first EU 
military operations tended to confirm this rationale: EUFOR Concordia in the Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia (2003) and EUFOR Althea in Bosnia (2004). In both cases, the CSDP 
took over for NATO in a crisis that affected the stability of EU’s close neighborhood at a time 
when the US was at war in Afghanistan and Iraq and sought to disengage from the Balkans 
(Pentland 2011, 559).  
As in the case of the EDC, although the transatlantic interpretation of the CSDP is 
essential, it cannot fully explain its evolution over time. Of the twelve EU military missions 
launched thus far, eight were located on the African continent, and two were naval operations 
conducted off the coasts of Africa (EEAS 2016). However, when the CSDP was launched in 
the late 1990s, Africa had never previously been a favored location for NATO interventions. In 
this region, the CSDP essentially took over for former colonial powers’ national policies rather 
than for NATO. During the Cold War, the US used to regard Africa as a ‘special European 
responsibility’ (Schraeder 2000, 399). Therefore, in Africa, the key question is not so much 
why Europeans started to act without the US but why they started to act together. Gegout (2005, 
437) argued that France promoted the first CSDP military operation in Africa, Operation 
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Artemis in the DRC, to prove the EU’s capacity to act without the US and even to ‘balance’ US 
power. However, this argument cannot fully explain why, specifically in Africa, EU military 
operations became regular in the early 2000s and then proved increasingly difficult to launch a 
few years later (Haine 2011, Koepf 2012). We shall identify another driving force behind CSDP 
operations, namely, the increased interdependence among Africa’s former colonial powers, 
especially France and the UK. We shall also see that similar to the situation in the 1950s, the 
CSDP has been hampered by the asymmetric nature of African crises, which unevenly affect 
European states’ interests. This asymmetry has led other continental powers, particularly 
Germany, to fear entrapment in African crisis and, in turn, France to fear abandonment. 
 
French-British interdependence in Africa 
  
In the late 1990s, three new factors increased the interdependence among former colonial 
powers in Africa: first, France’s decreasing ability to cope with African crises alone; second, 
the UK’s renewed interest in African crises; and, third, the increasingly regional nature of 
African crises, which tended to jointly affect both former colonial powers’ areas of influence.  
Despite decolonization, French former African colonies have continued to represent an 
essential sphere of influence, in which France finds strategic resources, particularly oil and 
uranium (Martin 1989), trade partners and political support for its international positions 
(Chafer 2002). In the early 1990s, France had still significant forces permanently stationed in 
Francophone Africa and had regularly conducted unilateral interventions to support friendly 
regimes since the 1960s (Gregory 2000). However, after the end of the Cold War, France saw 
its position in Africa seriously weaken. This situation became particularly obvious with the fall 
of friendly regimes in Rwanda (1994) and Zaire (1997). France’s allies were replaced by new 
leaders, which were notably supported by the former British colony of Uganda. Moreover, the 
French military intervention in Rwanda (1994) resulted in accusations of complicity in genocide 
without restoring France’s influence in the country. Noting its increasing inability to cope with 
African crises alone, the French government reacted by adopting a new strategy based on 
multilateral cooperation (Utley 2002, Chafer 2002). France thus reduced its forces stationed in 
Africa by one-third between 1997 and 2002 (Utley 2002, 136–137) and coordinated with the 
UK and the US to strengthen African states’ capacities to participate more fully in 
peacekeeping. This new multilateral strategy made France more dependent on it allies’ support 
and paved the way for the Europeanisation of its African policy. 
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The second key factor was the evolution of the UK, the other major former colonial 
power in Africa. British interests in former African colonies included trade, investments, access 
to strategic resources, political support in the UN, and the safety of its expatriates (Cumming 
2004, 111; Jackson 2006, 356–359; Vines 2011). Unlike France, the UK had abandoned its last 
African military base in 1975 and manifested a certain reluctance to intervene in Africa during 
the Cold War. However, starting in the 1990s, the rise of ethnic and civil conflicts encouraged 
the UK to become more involved in resolving African crises and to even engage in military 
combat, as in Sierra Leone, where it deployed 1,300 soldiers in 2000 to fight a rebel army 
(Abrahamsen and Williams 2001, Cumming 2004).  
The final determining factor was the nature of the African crises of the 1990s. In the 
context of regional conflicts, such as the Liberian civil war (Chafer 2013, 236–237) and the 
Congo wars, which involved both Anglophone and Francophone countries, the policies of 
former European colonizers towards their African allies were increasingly interdependent 
(Chafer and Cumming 2010, 1143). This was particularly true in the recurring conflicts of the 
African Great Lakes region. On the one hand, the French recreated strong ties with the DRC 
(formerly Zaire) and had important oil interests with neighboring countries such as Congo-
Brazzaville and Gabon (Gegout 2009, 233). On the other hand, Uganda was a long-time British 
ally that London politically and financially supported, along with Rwanda (Cumming 2011, 
Jackson 2006, 371). The two former colonial powers could not stabilize their respective areas 
of influence without coordinating. This interdependence, in the sense of a mutual need for 
assistance, favored the partial Europeanisation of the countries’ activities in the region. This 
trend began at the Saint-Malo Summit of 1998, immediately after the second Congo War broke 
out, which involved the DRC, Rwanda and Uganda in particular. In addition to a section 
dedicated to European defense cooperation, the Summit’s declaration stated that France and the 
UK should cooperate more systematically in Africa, both bilaterally and within the EU 
framework (Chafer and Cumming 2010, 1132). At the Cahors Summit (2001), both states stated 
their common goal of restoring peace to the DRC. At the Touquet Summit (2003), they 
explicitly stated their wish to see the EU contribute to African security through CSDP 
operations. In the field, the Europeanisation of former colonial powers’ African policy resulted 
in the launch of the first autonomous EU military operation, the 2003 Operation Artemis, on 
the boundary between the DRC and Uganda, which was primarily conducted by French troops 
(1,785 soldiers) with British support (111 soldiers). Through this operation, France returned to 
the Great Lakes region, where its traditional policy had failed a few years earlier and from 
which it had virtually withdrawn since 1994 (Bagayoko 2004). In 2003, military cooperation 
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between France and the DRC began again after having been suspended in 1994 (French 
Embassy in the DRC 2012). European cooperation protected the operation against a possible 
backlash from Rwanda, which maintained very poor relations with Paris but was close to 
London (Gegout 2005, 438). The UK was also able to convince its Ugandan allies to make the 
Entebbe Airport available to European forces (Bagayoko 2004, 107). Finally, this French-
British strategy of using CSDP operations in Africa was endorsed by the EU in 2005 (Council 
of the EU 2005). 
However, this French-British interdependence in the Great Lakes region was not 
necessarily replicated in other parts of Africa. In 2013, commenting on the launch of the French-
led EU training mission in Mali, British Foreign Secretary William Hague admitted the 
following: 
It is true that Britain is much more heavily represented [in Kenya] because of the 
myriad of connections, of individuals, families, businesses, as well as the history in 
countries like Somalia, Kenya and so on, than in Francophone West Africa. 
(Politics.co.uk 2013)  
This quotation illustrates the limits of French-British interdependence in Africa. Since former 
colonial powers have specific ties in different sub-regions, they are not always evenly affected 
by localized African crises, which sometimes leads to a ‘postcolonial division of labor’ rather 
than joint action (Chafer 2013, 249). 
 
Fears of entrapment and abandonment in Africa 
 
Although African crises initially increased former colonial powers’ interdependence, thus 
stimulating European defense cooperation in Africa, they also constitute asymmetric crises in 
the sense that they only affect some European states’ strategic interests. This asymmetry has 
led to fears of entrapment and abandonment and has thus sharply limited the ambitions of recent 
EU military operations. 
In particular, Germany did not have the same colonial ties as France and the UK in 
Africa. The Germans were not pursuing any strategic interest in Africa (Hofmeier 2002) and 
long sought to limit the scope of the CSDP to Europe’s neighborhood (Bagayoko and Gibert 
2009, 799–802). Therefore, the French-British push for EU military operations in Africa led 
Germany to fear entrapment. Buchet de Neuilly (2009, 84) reports that when Operation Artemis 
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was proposed to the EU Political and Security Committee, the German ambassador initially 
declared, ‘Over my dead body, there will not be any operation in Africa’. Germany had no 
strategic interest in the African Great Lakes region, and it finally reluctantly consented to the 
operation under French and British pressures, though offering only a limited contribution 
(Schmidt 2011, 569–570). In particular, the French President had to make ‘insistent demands’ 
to the German Chancellor (Fromion and Rouillard 2014, 253). Similarly, during the preparation 
for EUFOR DRC, a mission pushed by France, with the political support of the UK, which 
aimed to secure elections in the DRC (Cumming 2011), Germany—particularly its Ministry of 
Defense—was initially reluctant to participate. The Germans were afraid of being ‘used by 
France’ and were willing to let the former colonial powers take care of Africa (Le Figaro 2006). 
Chancellor Merkel’s eventual agreement to German participation was widely interpreted as a 
strategy to prove her commitment to the French-German relationship (Schmitt 2012, 67–69). 
According to a French military source, the Germans were not convinced, but they received side 
payments from the French on other issues (Interview with a French general, May 2016). 
Germany accepted leading the operation with 740 soldiers, but it imposed preconditions that 
restricted the mission’s geographical scope and timeframe (Schmidt 2011, 574). In 2006, a 
report by the French Senate’s Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defense already noted that, 
because of its history, France was suspected to be using ‘the EU to maintain its own influence 
and interests’ by its European partners (Dulait 2006, 42). 
In subsequent operations, the reluctance of France’s partners developed into a clear fear 
of entrapment. It became particularly obvious in the case of EUFOR Chad/CAR (2008–2009). 
France, which had proposed the EU operation, had established a permanent bilateral military 
presence in Chad since 1986 (1,150 soldiers of Operation Épervier) and had a clear stake in 
Chad’s stability (Dijkstra 2010, 397). If EUFOR Chad/CAR officially intended to protect 
refugees from Darfur, most European leaders, especially those in Germany and the UK, feared 
that it would actually be used to strengthen the Chadian regime against Sudanese-supported 
opposition movements, in line with France’s traditional policy (Mérand and Rakotonirina 
2009). Generating forces proved difficult, and initial targets could not be fulfilled (Seibert 2010, 
17). In the words of a diplomat (Le Monde, 2007), the French did not want the mission to appear 
as ‘a French operation in Africa painted in blue’, but they eventually had to provide half of the 
troops (1,711 French soldiers). Germany and the UK refused to send forces, arguing that they 
were already engaged in Afghanistan. In particular, Germany had initially tried to keep the issue 
off the agenda, and Schmitt (2012, 73–75) reports that Frank-Walter Steinmeier, Germany’s 
Foreign Minister, accused his French counterpart Bernard Kouchner of confusing French and 
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European interests in Chad. More generally, a French military source described the French-
German disagreement as a clash between two different visions of the world—the French being 
orientated towards the South and the Germans towards the East. This clash was particularly 
visible among the German military, many of whom argued that they had not joined the 
Bundeswehr to fight overseas (Interview with a French general, May 2016). Regarding the 
decision makers’ perceptions, President Sarkozy stated in February 2008 that ‘France and 
Europe’s security and prosperity are inseparable from Africa’s security and prosperity’ 
(Sarkozy 2008), whereas German elites did not perceive any clear German interest in Africa 
(Schmitt 2012, 74–75). As EU operations in Africa were becoming more frequent, Germany 
began to call the CSDP ‘the French Africa Korps’ (Haine 2011, 590). This mockery echoed that 
of French military leaders of the 1950s, who used the term ‘Teutonic Knights’ when accusing 
the EDC of being too exclusively orientated towards the East and German interests.  
More recently, crises have multiplied on the African continent, leading to an increasing 
French commitment. In 2015, approximately 5,800 French soldiers were engaged in operations 
in Africa, including 3,000 in the Sahel and 2,000 in Central Africa. Similar to Sarkozy before 
him, President Hollande reaffirmed that France had a ‘special relationship’ with Africa and that 
Europe and Africa faced ‘the same threats, the same dangers’ (Hollande 2013). Consequently, 
tensions have grown between France and its European partners, which are often reluctant to 
send troops to Africa. This situation has led to a feeling of abandonment on the French side.  
Those tensions appeared in particular in early 2013, when France intervened in Mali to 
fight an Islamist rebellion. Apart from its traditional role in a former colony with which it has 
a military cooperation agreement (French Embassy in Mali 2013), France’s prompt reaction 
could be explained by its specific economic interests in the region, particularly in French-run 
uranium mines in Niger (Chafer 2014, 522–524; Lavallée and Völkel 2015, 175). In Mali, 
France relied much more on its African allies, particularly 2,400 Chadian soldiers, than on 
European support (Le Monde 2013a). This could partially be explained by the urgency of the 
situation and the fact that EU operations usually take a few months to be launched, which 
encouraged the French to initially rely on bilateral support (Interview with a French diplomat, 
June 2016). However, because of the involvement of Jihadist groups, the French Ministry of 
Defense also believed that the Malian crisis directly concerned European security, thus 
justifying the EU’s commitment. Nevertheless, even with this argument, the French struggled 
to convince their partners for months, and France was often still considered to be defending its 
own ‘backyard’ (Interview with a French diplomat, June 2016). The EU eventually provided 
the Malian army with a training mission (EUTM Mali) that initially included 551 soldiers, of 
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which 207 were French. Gathering contributions was difficult and delayed several times. In 
January 2013, the French Foreign Minister, Laurent Fabius admitted that France could not force 
its partners to provide soldiers and commented, ‘There are limits to the [Common] security and 
defense policy, even if we regret it’ (Fabius 2013). In March 2013, Fabius even had to call for 
European solidarity to provide a 90-soldier protection force for the mission (Pueyo and Fromion 
2013, 34). A report by the French Senate’s Committee of Foreign Affairs and Defense 
considered the Malian crisis to demonstrate that France’s European partners still wrongly 
perceived Africa as ‘peripheral’ and that it revealed the CSDP’s ‘weaknesses’: ‘The strategic 
priority that France gives to its southern margins is not shared by some member states’ 
(Chevènement and Larcher 2013, 21–25). The report particularly regretted that the EU did not 
engage in combat with a ‘EUFOR Mali’ mission. Similarly, according to the National 
Assembly’s Committee on European Affairs, European solidarity was not ‘satisfactory’ in Mali, 
and the difficulty to mount EUTM Mali demonstrated the limits of the willingness to relaunch 
‘Defense Europe’ (Pueyo and Fromion 2013, 32–33). However, a more recent report notes that, 
although the reaction of France’s partners was initially ‘frustrating’, those partners started to 
slowly take over for French troops in EUTM Mali (Fromion and Rouillard 2014, 253). 
The same scenario occurred in the CAR, which has a defense partnership with France 
(French Embassy in the CAR 2016). At the end of 2013, France intervened in the CAR to 
disarm violent militias alongside troops from the African Union, which led a former French 
Minister of Defense to comment that Europe had ‘abandoned the idea of having an impact on 
world affairs’ (Le Monde 2013b). Germany in particular had initially blocked EU support of 
the French intervention (IISS 2014). In January 2014, the EU approved a military operation that 
aimed to secure the Central African capital of Bangui (EUFOR CAR). However, France 
initially provided more than one-third of the 677 soldiers, and gathering contributions was an 
‘ordeal’, according to a French diplomat (Le Monde 2014). In other member states, the 
operation was often regarded as ‘France’s mission’, and the French Minister of Defense had to 
‘hammer’ his demands in bilateral meetings to rally his counterparts (Interview with a French 
diplomat, June 2016). Moreover, the launch of EUFOR CAR was negotiated in a context 
marked by the annexation of Crimea by Russia in March 2014, which led Poland and Romania 
to waver in their commitment, arguing that it was not the right time to send troops out of Europe 
(AFP 2014). According to a French diplomat, Eastern European states were ‘obsessed with 
Russia’ (Interview with a French diplomat, June 2016). As in the 1950s, European defense 
cooperation was thus weakened by the tension between an East-West crisis in Europe and an 
overseas crisis in Africa. General Pontiès, Commander of EUFOR CAR, noted the following: 
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Initially, there were some very promising opportunities. However, in the meantime, 
the Ukrainian crisis occurred. We may have little awareness of this in France, but 
to Central Europe, this crisis is of considerable importance, if only for geographical 
reasons. It is true that the evolution of the international situation has slowed the 
process and reduced contributions. (Le Point 2014) 
General Pontiès also regretted that most member states only sent symbolic contributions, which 
made the organization of the force more difficult (Gautier et al. 2016, 127). 
As such, France has publicly complained about the lack of support from its partners. On 
28 August 2014, French President François Hollande commented, ‘The European Union cannot 
expect everything from one or two member states—I would say essentially one, namely, 
France—to cover the bulk of budgetary and human commitment to the security of all’ (Hollande 
2014). Similarly, in February 2015, the difficult launch of a small-scale EU military advisory 
mission in Central Africa (EUMAM CAR) led the French Minister of Defense, Jean-Yves Le 
Drian, to comment, ‘The burden of European security is not equally shared’ (Bruxelles2 2015). 
Finally, the latest manifestation of this French feeling of abandonment occurred when 
France invoked article 42.7, requiring other EU members to provide assistance after the Paris 
attacks of November 2015. Indeed, France actually expected more support from the EU in 
Africa. The Minister of Defense explained his frustration: 
France cannot do everything anymore. France cannot be at the same time in Sahel, 
in Central Africa, in Lebanon, in the intervention and retaliations in the Levant, and 
in addition secure its national territory with its own forces. (Le Drian 2015)  
In response, some European countries agreed to support French efforts in Africa. Some 
provided logistical support; Germany sent troops to the UN mission in Mali; and Belgium took 
command of EUTM Mali. However, according to a French diplomat, ‘There was no trigger 
effect. It was not massive’ (Interview with a French diplomat, June 2016). Similarly, according 
to a French Senate report, because aid was essentially bilateral, the implementation of article 
42.7 was yet again a missed opportunity for the CSDP (Gautier et al. 2016, 129). 
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Asymmetric crises in Africa have thus led to fears of both entrapment and abandonment, 
which contribute to the current ‘crisis of CSDP’ and the sense of disappointment that surrounds 
it (Howorth 2014, 9–10). In the words of a French diplomat, ‘we still launch missions, but they 
are difficult to put together and the result is not satisfactory. EU missions are increasingly less 
robust, and we often reach operational capacity thanks to non-member states support’ 
(Interview with a French diplomat, June 2016). 
 
Conclusions 
 
This article has argued that European defense cooperation is a response to the military 
interdependence that international crises impose on European states. Inter-European 
interdependence increases if several European states’ interests are jointly affected by a crisis, if 
no single state is able to address the crisis on its own, and if American support is lacking or 
inadequate. Conversely, interdependence decreases when an asymmetric crisis unevenly affects 
European states or when concerned states can cope with a crisis either on their own or with 
adequate support from the US.  
In 1950, the European army project was stimulated by French-German interdependence 
in the context of the East-West crisis. In the 1990s, the CSDP was stimulated by, on the one 
hand, European interdependence that resulted from the US’s relative disengagement in the 
context of the Balkan crises and, on the other hand, the interdependence among former colonial 
powers in the context of increasingly regional African crises. Furthermore, the EDC and the 
CSDP have both suffered from asymmetric crises. In the 1950s, colonial crises solely affected 
France, leading French leaders to regard the EDC as a hindrance to their military efforts 
overseas. Since the 1990s, African crises have mainly affected former colonial powers’ 
interests, which has led other continental powers, such as Germany, to fear entrapment and, in 
turn, France to fear abandonment.  
Theoretically, this article has demonstrated the strong heuristic potential of the concept 
of military interdependence in the study of European defense cooperation. Realist explanations 
that are based on the concepts of balancing and bandwagoning tend to produce an American-
centric bias, whereas constructivist and bureaucratic approaches tend to focus on how rather 
than why European defense cooperation developed. Instead, the concept of interdependence 
allows us to refocus on the inter-European dimension of European defense cooperation and to 
further explore its driving forces and impediments. The concept of interdependence emphasizes 
not so much the nature of external challenges (i.e., unbalanced power, threats, or risks to some 
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economic or political interest) but rather the impact of these challenges on the relations among 
European states. This refocus is even more interesting because the concept of interdependence 
is already central to the study of European economic, monetary and budgetary integrations 
(Stone Sweet and Sandholtz 1997, Moravcsik 1998, Schimmelfennig 2015). Schimmelfennig, 
Leuffen and Rittberger (2015) have already built on the concept of interdependence to compare 
EU integration in the areas of economy and defense. The further development of 
interdependence-based approaches to European defense cooperation could thus open fruitful 
cross-sector avenues for future research.  
Empirically, the two cases have highlighted a striking continuity between the 1950s and 
the 2000s: in both cases, tensions arose between France’s (neo)colonial commitments and its 
partners’ focus on continental crises. However, because this article is limited to the case of 
France, further research is necessary to explore the full implications of interdependence and 
asymmetric crises for other member states. Moreover, asymmetric crises cannot account for all 
the difficulties that the CSDP faces (Howorth 2014). Nevertheless, because of the central role 
that France plays in European defense, asymmetric crises in Africa have constituted one of the 
main obstacles to effective European cooperation in this area. 
What conclusions can we draw regarding the future of the CSDP? First, continental 
crises, such as the 1950s East-West crisis or the more recent Ukrainian crisis, tend to jointly 
affect most European states because of their geographic proximity. Nevertheless, such crises 
are not necessarily conducive to more European defense cooperation because of the US’s 
commitment to the defense of Europe through NATO, which tends to alleviate inter-European 
interdependence. However, if tensions between the EU and Russia worsen in a context marked 
by a continuing American shift towards the Asia-Pacific region, military interdependence 
among European states could increase, eventually prompting a stronger defense cooperation. 
However, even in this scenario, the Russian threat would likely constitute an asymmetric 
problem, in the sense that it would affect Eastern European countries, such as Poland and the 
Baltic states, much more than Western European states. This situation could generate fears of 
abandonment in the East and fears of entrapment in the West, which would undermine 
European cooperation. 
Second, because of the particular importance of former colonial ties, overseas crises are 
still likely to be asymmetric crises for Europeans. However, even overseas crises could generate 
more interdependence among European states because of their impact on global phenomena, 
such as trade, migration or terrorism. Operation EUNAVFOR Atalanta, which has fought piracy 
off the Somali coast since 2008, could represent the beginning of such a development. In the 
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case of EUTM Mali, officials from the French Ministry of Defense also noted that France’s 
European partners slowly realized that Mali’s stability could have implications in terms of 
illegal immigration and trafficking and, in turn, became more ready to send troops (Fromion 
and Rouillard 2014, 253). Even more interesting is the case of EUNAVFOR Sophia, which was 
launched in June 2015 to counter migrant smuggling in the Mediterranean. Contrary to previous 
operations deployed to Africa, which tended to mainly motivate former colonial powers with 
specific interests in the region, this mission addresses the issue of immigration to Europe, which 
potentially affects all member states’ interests (IISS 2015) and renders border countries and 
destination countries interdependent. This could explain why the political dynamic behind 
Sophia was ‘more consensual’ (Interview with a French diplomat, June 2016). Recently, 
Operation Sophia was also tasked with combating arms smuggling to Islamic State fighters in 
Libya. A more active defense cooperation could thus emerge out of the increasing 
interconnectedness between external crises and internal issues, such as migration and terrorism 
(Ioannides 2014).  
Finally, another way to alleviate the negative impact of asymmetric crises may involve 
transactions between states that fear abandonment in different crises. In 2014, the Director of 
Strategic Affairs of the French Ministry of Defense suggested that the fact that France had been 
among the first to support NATO ‘reassurance measures’ in favor of Baltic states that felt 
threatened by Russia had encouraged Estonia to send troops to Africa in return (Fromion and 
Rouillard 2014, 253). In the future, the systematization of such inter-areas transactions could 
allow the CSDP to become less vulnerable to asymmetric crises by responding to fears of 
abandonment, rendering entrapment more acceptable and, in turn, making cooperation less 
risky.  
  
Pierre Haroche 
 
29 
 
References 
Abrahamsen, R. and Williams, P., 2001. Ethics and Foreign Policy: The Antinomies of New 
Labour's ‘Third Way’ in Sub-Saharan Africa. Political Studies, 49 (2), 249–264. 
AFP, 2014. Les Européens, préoccupés par l’Ukraine, délaissent la Centrafrique. 14 March. 
Archives diplomatiques, 1953. Note de la direction d’Europe, 31 January. Europe généralités, 
70. 
Archives nationales, 1953. Note sur la CED, 28 January. 457AP/34. 
Aron, R. and Lerner, D., eds, 1956. La querelle de la C.E.D. Essais d’analyse sociologique. 
Paris: Armand Colin.  
Art, R.J., 2004. Europe Hedges Its Security Bets. In: Paul, T.V., Wirtz, J.J. and Fortmann, M. 
eds. Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21st Century. Stanford University 
Press, 179–213. 
Bagayoko, N., 2004. L’opération Artémis, un tournant pour la politique européenne de sécurité 
et de défense? Afrique contemporaine, 209, 101–116. 
Bagayoko, N. and Gibert, M.V., 2009. The Linkage between Security, Governance and 
Development: the European Union in Africa. Journal of Development Studies, 45 (5), 
789–814. 
Baudet, F., 1994. La Communauté européenne de Défense et l’Armée de l’Air. In: Girault R. 
and Bossuat G., eds. Europe brisée, Europe retrouvée. Paris: Publication de la 
Sorbonne, 155-174. 
Berenskoetter, F., 2013. Jumping off the Bandwagon. Contemporary Security Policy, 34 (2), 
382–386. 
Berenskoetter, F. and Giegerich, B., 2010. From NATO to ESDP: A Social Constructivist 
Analysis of German Strategic Adjustment after the End of the Cold War. Security 
Studies, 19 (3), 407–52. 
Bodin, M., 1996. La France et ses soldats, Indochine, 1945–1954. Paris: L’Harmattan.  
Brecher, M., 1996. Introduction: Crisis, Conflict, War: State of the Discipline. International 
Political Science Review, 17 (2), 127–139. 
Pierre Haroche 
 
30 
 
Bruxelles2, 2015. Quand un Breton secoue le cocotier européen, ça donne cela [online]. 19 
February. Available from: http://www.bruxelles2.eu/2015/02/19/quand-un-breton-
secoue-ca-donne-cela/ [Accessed 3 March 2016]. 
Buchet de Neuilly, Y., 2006. La crise? Quelle crise? Dynamiques européennes de gestion des 
crises. In: Le Pape, M., Siméant, J. and Vidale, C., eds. Crises extrêmes. Face aux 
massacres, aux guerres civiles et aux génocides. Paris: La Découverte, 270–286. 
Buchet de Neuilly, Y., 2009. La politique étrangère de l’UE dans le champ de la sécurité 
internationale. In: Schwok, R. and Mérand, F., eds. L’Union européenne et la sécurité 
internationale. Théories et pratiques. Brussels: Bruylant, 73–88. 
Cadeau, I., 2010. 1954–1956, le départ du corps expéditionnaire français d’Extrême-Orient. 
Revue historique des Armées, 258, 67–81. 
Cattet, S., 2010. La Tourmente 1830–1964: La France en Afrique du Nord. Paris: ECPAD. 
Cha, V.D., 2000. Abandonment, Entrapment, and Neoclassical Realism in Asia: The United 
States, Japan, and Korea. International Studies Quarterly, 44 (2), 261–91. 
Chafer, T., 2002. Franco-African Relations: No Longer so Exceptional? African Affairs, 101 
(404), 343–363. 
Chafer, T., 2013. The UK and France in West Africa: Toward Convergence? African Security, 
6 (3-4), 234–256. 
Chafer, T., 2014. Hollande and Africa Policy. Modern & Contemporary France, 22 (4), 513–
531. 
Chafer, T. and Cumming, G., 2010. Beyond Fashoda: Anglo-French security cooperation in 
Africa since Saint-Malo. International Affairs, 86 (5), 1129–1147. 
Chevènement J.P. and Larcher G., 2013. Senate report on the intervention in Mali, made on 
behalf of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defense and Armed Forces, 16 April, n° 
513. 
Cladi, L. and Locatelli, A., 2012. Bandwagoning, Not Balancing: Why Europe Confounds 
Realism. Contemporary Security Policy, 33 (2), 264–288. 
Pierre Haroche 
 
31 
 
Council of the EU, 2005. The EU and Africa: towards a strategic partnership [online]. Available 
from: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_PRES-05-367_en.htm [Accessed, 13 
August 2016]. 
Cumming, G., 2004. UK African Policy in the Post-Cold War Era: From Realpolitik to 
Moralpolitik? Commonwealth & Comparative Politics, 42 (1), 106–128. 
Cumming, G., 2011. The UK and France in the DRC: Making Their Own Peace. In: Chafer, T. 
and Cumming, G., eds. From Rivalry to Partnership?: New Approaches to the 
Challenges of Africa. Farnham: Ashgate, 139–58. 
David, F., 2006. Lâcher la proie pour l’ombre? La fusion des nouvelles forces allemandes dans 
l’armée européenne, vue par les autorités militaires françaises (1951-1954). Cahiers 
du Centre d’études d’histoire de la défense, 29, 117–139. 
Dijkstra H., 2010. The Military Operation of the EU in Chad and the Central African Republic: 
Good Policy, Bad Politics, International Peacekeeping, 17 (3), 395–407. 
Dijkstra, H., 2012. Agenda-setting in the common security and defence policy: an 
institutionalist perspective. Cooperation and conflict, 47 (4), 454–472. 
Dulait et al., 2006. Senate report on crisis management in Sub-Saharan Africa, made on behalf 
of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defense and Armed Forces, 3 July, n° 450. 
Dyson, T., 2013a. Balancing Threat, not Capabilities: European Defence Cooperation as 
Reformed Bandwagoning. Contemporary Security Policy, 34 (2), 387–391. 
Dyson, T., 2013b. The Material Roots of European Strategy: Beyond Culture and Values. 
Contemporary Security Policy, 34 (3), 419–445. 
Dyson, T. and Konstadinides, T., eds, 2013. European Defence Cooperation in EU Law and IR 
Theory, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
EEAS, 2016. Ongoing missions and operations [online]. Available from: 
http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/index_en.htm [Accessed 17 
August 2016]. 
Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, M., 2014. Europe’s Defence Dilemma. The International Spectator, 49 
(2), 83–116. 
Pierre Haroche 
 
32 
 
Fabius, L, 2013. Press conference, Brussels. 17 January. Available from: 
http://www.ambafrance-bg.org/Conference-de-presse-de-Laurent [Accessed 5 March 
2016]. 
French Embassy in Mali, 2013. La mission de cooperation et de defense [online]. Available 
from: http://www.ambafrance-ml.org/La-mission-de-cooperation [Accessed 2 May 
2016]. 
French Embassy in the CAR, 2016. La France et la République centrafricaine [online]. 
Available from: http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/dossiers-pays/republique-
centrafricaine/la-france-et-la-republique-centrafricaine/ [Accessed 2 May 2016]. 
French Embassy in the DRC, 2012. Relations militaires [online]. Available from: 
http://www.ambafrance-cd.org/Relations-militaires [Accessed 4 May 2016]. 
Fromion Y. and Rouillard G., 2014. National Assembly report on French military operations in 
Africa, tabled by the Committee on National Defense and Armed Forces, 9 July, n° 
2114. 
Fursdon, E., 1980. The European Defense Community: A History. New York: St. Martin’s 
Press. 
Gautier J. et al., 2016. Senate report on external operations, made on behalf of the Committee 
on Foreign Affairs, Defense and Armed Forces, 13 July, n° 794. 
Gegout, C., 2005. Causes and Consequences of the EU's Military Intervention in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo: A Realist Explanation. European Foreign Affairs 
Review, 10 (3), 427–443. 
Gegout C., 2009. The West, Realism and Intervention in the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(1996–2006). International Peacekeeping, 16 (2), 231–244. 
Gentiloni, P. and Pinotti R., 2016. L’Italie appelle à un ‘Schengen de la défense’. Le Monde, 
11 August, p. 23. 
Giegerich, B., 2006. European Security and Strategic Culture. Baden-Baden: Nomos. 
Gregory, S., 2000. The French Military in Africa: Past and Present. African Affairs, 99 (396), 
435–448. 
Pierre Haroche 
 
33 
 
Guillen, P., 1983. Les chefs militaires français, le réarmement de l’Allemagne et la CED (1950-
1954). Revue d’histoire de la deuxième guerre mondiale et des conflits contemporains, 
129, 3–33. 
Haine, J.Y., 2011. The Failure of a European Strategic Culture – EUFOR CHAD: The Last of 
its Kind? Contemporary Security Policy, 32 (3), 582–603. 
Hofmann, S., 2011. Why Institutional Overlap Matters: CSDP in the European Security 
Architecture. Journal of Common Market Studies, 49 (1), 101–120. 
Hofmeier, R., 2002. Five decades of German-African relations: limited interests, low political 
profile, and substantial aid donor. In: Engel U. and Kappel R., eds. Germany’s Africa’s 
Policy Revisited: Interests, image and incrementalism. Münster: Lit Verlag, 39–62. 
Hollande, F., 2013. Opening speech of the Elysée Summit for Peace and Security in Africa, 6 
December. Available from: http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/allocution-du-
president-de-la-republique-pour-l-ouverture-du-sommet-de-l-elysee-pour-la-paix-et-
la-securite-en-afrique/ [Accessed 20 December 2016]. 
Hollande, F., 2014. Opening speech of the 22nd Ambassadors’ Conference. 28 August. 
Available from: http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/discours-d-ouverture-de-la-
conference-des-ambassadeurs/ [Accessed 3 March 2016]. 
Howorth, J., 2004. Discourse, Ideas, and Epistemic Communities in European Security and 
Defence Policy. West European Politics, 27 (2), 211–234. 
Howorth, J., 2014. European security post-Libya and post-Ukraine: in search of core leadership. 
Imagining Europe, 8, 1–37. 
Howorth, J. and Menon, A., 2009. Still Not Pushing Back: Why the European Union is Not 
Balancing the United States. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 53 (3), 727–44. 
Hyde-Price, A., 2006. Normative Power Europe: A Realist Critique. Journal of European 
Public Policy, 13 (2), 217–234. 
IISS, 2014. The EU’s Central African Republic mission. Strategic Comments, 20 (3), V–VI. 
IISS, 2015. EU's naval mission in Mediterranean sets precedents. Strategic Comments, 21 (6), 
VI-VII. 
Pierre Haroche 
 
34 
 
Ioannides, I., 2014. Inside-out and Outside-in: EU Security in the Neighbourhood. The 
International Spectator, 49 (1), 113–132. 
Jones, S., 2003. The European Union and the Security Dilemma. Security Studies, 12 (3), 114–
56. 
Journal Officiel de la République française, 1954. Assemblée nationale, 1ère séance, 28 August. 
Juin, A., 1960. Mémoires, tome 2. Paris: Arthème Fayard. 
Jackson, A., 2006. British–African Defence and Security Connections. Defence Studies, 6 (3), 
351–376.  
Keohane, R.O. and Nye, J.S., 1977. Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition. 
Boston: Little Brown. 
Kim, T., 2011. Why Alliances Entangle But Seldom Entrap States. Security Studies, 20 (3), 
350–377. 
Koepf, T., 2012. ‘Interventions françaises en Afrique: la fin de l'européanisation?’, Politique 
étrangère, (2), 415–426. 
Kreps, S.E., 2011. Coalitions of Convenience: United States Military Interventions after the 
Cold War. Oxford University Press. 
Krugman, P., 2013. Revenge of the Optimum Currency Area. NBER Macroeconomics Annual 
2012, 27, 439–448. 
Kupchan, C.A., 1988. NATO and the Persian Gulf: Examining Intra-Alliance Behavior. 
International Organization, 42 (2), 317–46. 
Lavallée, C. and Völkel, J.C., 2015. Military in Mali: The EU’s Action against Instability in the 
Sahel Region. European Foreign Affairs Review, 20 (2), 159–186.  
Le Drian, J.Y., 2015. Press conference, Brussels. 17 November. Available from: 
http://discours.vie-publique.fr/notices/153003031.html [Accessed 3 March 2016].  
Le Figaro, 2006. Des soldats allemands sur le fleuve Zaïre [online]. 31 July. Available from: 
http://www.lefigaro.fr/international/2006/07/31/01003-20060731ARTFIG90036-
des_soldats_allemands_sur_le_fleuve_zaire.php [Accessed 5 May 2016]. 
Pierre Haroche 
 
35 
 
Le Figaro, 2016. La feuille de route franco-allemande pour relancer l'Europe de la défense 
[online]. 12 September. Available from: 
http://www.lefigaro.fr/international/2016/09/11/01003-20160911ARTFIG00140-la-
feuille-de-route-franco-allemande-pour-relancer-l-europe-de-la-defense.php  
[Assessed 12 September 2016]. 
Le Monde, 2007. Paris peine à obtenir des soldats d'autres pays de l'Union. 25 September, p. 4. 
Le Monde, 2013a. L'armée tchadienne aux avant-postes de la guerre au Mali [online]. 4 March. 
Available from: http://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2013/03/04/l-armee-
tchadienne-aux-avants-postes-de-la-guerre-au-mali_1842230_3212.html [Accessed 
10 May 2016]. 
Le Monde, 2013b. L’Union européenne peu mobilisée en République centrafricaine [online]. 
11 December. Available from: http://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2013/12/11/l-
union-europeenne-peu-mobilisee-en-republique-centrafricaine_3528968_3212.html 
[Accessed 2 May 2016]. 
Le Monde, 2014. La Géorgie, plus gros contingent des forces européennes en RCA [online]. 2 
April. Available from: http://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2014/04/02/la-georgie-
plus-gros-contingent-des-forces-europeennes-en-rca_4394323_3212.html [Accessed 
3 March 2016]. 
Le Point, 2014. Centrafrique: Jamais l’Union européenne n’était allée aussi vite [online]. 5 
April. Available from: http://www.lepoint.fr/editos-du-point/jean-
guisnel/centrafrique-jamais-l-union-europeenne-n-etait-allee-aussi-vite-05-04-2014-
1809380_53.php [Accessed 3 March 2016]. 
Martin, G., 1989. Uranium: a Case-Study in Franco-African Relations. The Journal of Modern 
African Studies, 27 (4), 625–640. 
McMillan, S.M., 1997. Interdependence and Conflict, Mershon International Studies Review, 
41 (1), 33–58. 
Menon, A., 2011. European Defence Policy from Lisbon to Libya, Survival: Global Politics 
and Strategy, 53 (3), 75–90. 
Menon, A. and Witney N., 2015. After Paris: What Price European Defence? European Council 
on Foreign Relations, 150. 
Pierre Haroche 
 
36 
 
Mérand, F., 2010. Pierre Bourdieu and the Birth of European Defense. Security Studies, 19 (2), 
342–374. 
Mérand, F. and Rakotonirina, H.M., 2009. La force européenne au Tchad et en Centrafrique: le 
baptême du feu. Politique africaine, 114, 105–125. 
Meyer, C.O., 2006. The Quest for a European Strategic Culture: Changing Norms on Security 
and Defence in the European Union. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Meyer, C.O. and Strickmann, E., 2011. Solidifying Constructivism: How Material and 
Ideational Factors Interact in European Defence. Journal of Common Market Studies, 
49 (1), 61–81. 
Monnet, J., 1976. Mémoires. Paris: Fayard – Le Livre de Poche. 
Moravcsik, A., 1998. The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina 
to Maastricht. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
Müller P., 2016. EU foreign policy: no major breakthrough despite multiple crises. Journal of 
European Integration, 38 (3), 359–374. 
Nováky, N.I.M., 2015. Deploying EU military crisis management operations: a collective 
action perspective. European Security, 24 (4), 491-508. 
Oswald, F., 2006. Soft Balancing Between Friends: Transforming Transatlantic Relations. 
Debatte: Journal of Contemporary Central and Eastern Europe, 14 (2), 145–160. 
Parsons, C., 2003. A Certain Idea of Europe. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
Pentland, C.C., 2011. From Words to Deeds: Strategic Culture and the European Union’s 
Balkan Military Missions. Contemporary Security Policy, 32 (3), 551–566. 
Pohl, B., 2014. EU Foreign Policy and Crisis Management Operations: Power, purpose and 
domestic politics. London, Routledge. 
Politics.co.uk, 2013. Hague admits colonial approach to African terror problem [online]. 21 
January. Available from: http://www.politics.co.uk/news/2013/01/21/hague-admits-
colonial-approach-to-african-terror-problem [Assessed 5 May 2016]. 
Posen, B., 2006. European Union Security and Defence Policy: Response to Unipolarity? 
Security Studies, 15 (2), 149–86. 
Pierre Haroche 
 
37 
 
Press-Barnathan, G., 2006. Managing the Hegemon: NATO under Unipolarity. Security 
Studies, 15, (2), 271-309. 
Pueyo J. and Fromion Y., 2013. National Assembly report on Defense Europe, tabled by the 
Committee on European Affairs, 9 April, n° 911. 
Rosato, S., 2011. Europe United: Power Politics and the Making of the European Community. 
Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
Sarkozy, N., 2008. Speech on Franco-African relations, Cap Town. 28 February. Available 
from: http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/IMG/pdf/PARLEMENT_AS.pdf [Accessed 1 
December 2016]. 
Schimmelfennig, F., 2015. Liberal intergovernmentalism and the euro area crisis. Journal of 
European Public Policy, 22 (2), 177–195.  
Schimmelfennig, F., Leuffen, D. and Rittberger, B., 2015. The European Union as a system of 
differentiated integration: interdependence, politicization and differentiation. Journal 
of European Public Policy, 22 (6), 764–782. 
Schmidt, P., 2011. The EU’s Military Involvement in the Democratic Republic of Congo: 
Security Culture, Interests and Games. Contemporary Security Policy, 32 (3), 567–
581. 
Schmidt, P. and Zyla B., eds, 2013. European Security Policy and Strategic Culture. Abingdon: 
Routledge. 
Schmitt, O., 2012. Strategic Users of Culture: German Decisions for Military Action. 
Contemporary Security Policy, 33 (1), 59–81. 
Schraeder, P.J., 2000. Cold War to Cold Peace: Explaining U.S.-French Competition in 
Francophone Africa. Political Science Quarterly, 115 (3), 395–419. 
Seibert, B.H., 2010. Operation EUFOR Tchad/RCA and the European Union’s Common 
Security and Defense Policy, Carlisle, Strategic Studies Institute. 
Service historique de la Défense, 1952. Ordre du jour relatif à la CED, 17 February. GR 1 Q 
64. 
Service historique de la Défense, 1953a. Le général Koenig se prononce contre le projet 
d’armée européenne, 28 January. GR 1 Q 65. 
Pierre Haroche 
 
38 
 
Service historique de la Défense, 1953b. L’armée européenne et le réarmement allemand. GR 
1 Q 65, 8. 
Service historique de la Défense, 1953c. Protocoles additionnels au Traité instituant la CED. 24 
March 24. GR 1 Q 68.  
Snyder, G.H., 1984. The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics. World Politics, 36 (4), 461–
495.  
Stone Sweet, A. and Sandholtz, W., 1997. European integration and supranational governance. 
Journal of European Public Policy, 4 (3), 297–317. 
Tams, C., 1999. The Functions of a European Security and Defense Identity and its Institutional 
Form. In: Haftendorn H., Keohane R.O. and Wallander C.A., eds. Imperfect Unions: 
Security Institutions over Time and Space. Oxford University Press, 80–103. 
Trachtenberg, M. and Gehrz, C., 2000. America, Europe, and German Rearmament, August–
September 1950. Journal of European Integration History, 6 (2), 9–35. 
Utley, R., 2002. ‘Not to do less but to do better…’: French military policy in Africa. 
International Affairs, 78 (1), 129–146. 
Vial, P., 2000. Le militaire et le politique: le maréchal Juin et le général Ely face à la CED 
(1948-1954). In: Dumoulin, M., ed. La Communauté européenne de défense, leçons 
pour demain? Brussels: PIE-Peter Lang, 135–158. 
Vines, A., 2011. Africa and the United Kingdom: Labour’s Legacy, May 1997-May 2010. In: 
Chafer, T. and Cumming, G., eds. From Rivalry to Partnership?: New Approaches to 
the Challenges of Africa. Farnham: Ashgate, 25–40. 
Wallander, C.A. and Keohane, R.O. 1999. Risk, Threat, and Security Institutions. In: Helga 
Haftendorn H., Keohane R.O. and Wallander C.A., eds. Imperfect Unions: Security 
Institutions over Time and Space. Oxford University Press, 21–47. 
Weiss, M., 2012. Transaction Costs and the Establishment of the European Security and 
Defense Policy. Security Studies, 21 (4), 654-82. 
Weitsman, P.A., 2014. Waging War: Alliances, Coalitions and Institutions of Interstate 
Violence. Stanford University Press. 
Pierre Haroche 
 
39 
 
Weldes, J., 1996. Constructing National Interests. European Journal of International Relations, 
2 (3), 275–318. 
  
Pierre Haroche 
 
40 
 
Table 1. The impact of crises on European states’ interdependence 
Interdependence + Interdependence - 
Insufficient capacity 
Lacking or inadequate American support 
European states jointly affected  
Sufficient capacity 
Adequate American support 
European states unevenly affected 
 
 
 
